Figure 63:

                     Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921)

 

 

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1963; 24. Aufl. 1994;
First edition was under the Titel „Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung“ in 1921 in the last volume (14) of Ostwalds Annalen der Naturphilosophie;
in 1922 C. K. Ogden prepared for Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, a bi-lingual edition, whose German text had been revised by Wittgenstein himself;
a new edition was published by David Pears and Brian McGuinness in 1961 for Routledge, London; reprinted as critical edition under the titel: „Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung“.by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 2nd ed. 2001; some reprints;
see also: Werkausgabe. 8 vol., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1984, vol. 1, 16th ed. 2004.

 

 

Not many philosophers of science are aware that the Viennese philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein has carefully studied the first model theory of modern science, the chapter on „dynamic models“ in the „Prinzipien der Mechanik“ (1894) by the German physicist Heinrich Hertz.

Hertz himself relied on the theories and terminology of James Clerk Maxwell (1873, 1876).

 

In World War I Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote his „Tractatus logico-philosophicus" (published 1921, in English 1922). Heinrich Hertz is one of the rare cited scientists and philosophers. In 4.04 Wittgenstein points to the chapter „Dynamische Modelle“ in Hertz' „ Principles of Mechanics“ (viz. also 6.361).

 

Some key phrases in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus read in German (1969):

 

1            Die Welt ist alles,  was der Fall ist.

1.13       Die Tatsachen im logischen Raum sind die Welt.

1.2         Die Welt zerfällt in Tatsachen.

2.06       Das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten ist die Wirklichkeit.

2.063    Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt.

2.1         Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.

2.12       Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.

2.182    Jedes Bild ist auch ein logisches.

3            Das logische Bild der Tatsachen ist der Gedanke.

3.1         Im Satz drückt sich der Gedanke sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus.

4            Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.

4.01       Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.
Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken.

 

These key phrases read in English

(1922; in brackets different translations of the 1961 edition):

 

1            The world is everything that is the case. (The world is all that is the case.)

1.13       The facts in logical space are the world.

1.2         The world divides into facts.

2.06       The existence and non-existence of atomic facts is the reality. (The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is the reality.)

2.063    The total reality is the world. (The sum-total of reality is the world.)

2.1         We make to ourselves pictures of facts. (We picture facts to ourselves.)

2.12       The picture is a model of reality. (A picture ...)

2.182    Every picture is also a logical picture. (Every picture is at the same time a logical one.)

3            The logical picture of the facts is the thought. (A logical picture of facts is a thought.)

3.1         In the proposition the thought is expressed perceptibly through the senses. (In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.)

4            The thought is the significant proposition. (A thought is a proposition with a sense.)

4.01       The proposition is a picture of reality. (A proposition …)
The proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is. (A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.)

 

 

Ludwig Wittgenstein has been characterized as theoretician of isomorphy, e. g. in the  concise and manifold overview of Wolfgang Stegmüller on the main trends of contemporary philosophy (1965, 524-561). Of equal importance are chapters VI and VII in Erik Stenius' "Wittgensteins Traktat" (1969) and chapter XV in Friedrich Waismann (1976).

 

For Wittgensteins “Bildtheorie” see also Jörg Burkhardt (1965), Wolfgang Stegmüller (1966), Viktor A. Stoff (1969, 70-78) and Hans-Joachim Glock (1996).

 

On Wittgenstein and Hertz see: P. Barker (1980), A. D. Wilson (1989), K. Hamilton (2002) and P. C. Kjaergaard (2002).

 

 

Bibliography

model: special topics - James Clerk Maxwell/ Heinrich Hertz/ Ludwig Wittgenstein